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An Economic Analysis of Eminent Domain

Patricia Munch
RAND Corporation

A theoretical analysis of land assembly with and without eminent domain
concludes that, contrary to traditional assumptions, eminent domain is
not necessarily a more efficient institution than the free market for con-

solidating many contiguous but separately owned parcels into a single
ownership unit. In practice, prices paid under eminent domain may
differ systematically from the "fair market value" standard, depending
on court costs of buyer and seller. Evidence from urban renewal supports

the hypothesis that, due to the structure of court costs, high-valued
properties receive more than market value and low-valued properties
receive less than market value.

Introduction

Eminent domain (ED) is the legal right to acquire property by forced
rather than by voluntary exchange. When a buyer seeking to acquire a
property has the power of ED, he must attempt to negotiate a voluntary

sale. But if his highest offer is rejected, he may condemn the property,

that is, obtain a forced sale at a price determined in a court of law.
In the United States, the use of ED is constrained by constitutional
provisions at the federal and state level which typically require that
private property only be taken for "public use" and only after payment

of "just compensation."' Enforcement of these constitutional provisions
is divided between the legislatures and the judiciary. Legislatures-

federal and state have the right to grant ED power. They typically

I would like to thank the members of my thesis committee, Professors George J. Stigler,
Gary S. Becker, and Ronald H. Coase, for their guidance and valuable insights. I also

benefited from the comments of an anonymous referee.
' Generalizations on the legal aspects of ED are based on Lewis (1909) and Nichols

(1970).
[Journal of Political Economy, 1976, vol. 84, no. 3]
) 1976 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
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grant it to a particular body or for a specific project, leaving to the

discretion of the grantee the decision as to which parcels of land to acquire
and whether or not to exercise its latent power of condemnation. The

main role of the judiciary is to determine "just compensation," not to
review the legitimacy of the taking of a particular parcel.2 Thus, ED is

effectively a reassignment of property rights: the seller is deprived of his
right to refuse to sell and constrained in his right to bargain over price.
However, because of the just-compensation provision, the curtailment of

private property rights implied by ED is less than that inherent in the
taxing and regulatory powers of government. In fact, ED may be
interpreted as a limitation on the police power of the state against private
property in real estate (Scheiber 1971).
The growth in the use of ED over time suggests, if the survivorship
principle may be applied to institutions, that ED reduces some component

of costs to at least one party. There are two, not mutually exclusive,

possibilities: (1) ED reduces total costs, permitting a net gain in efficiency,

and (2) ED redistributes costs and therefore wealth.
If ED were a simple transfer of well-defined property rights, and if

transactions costs under both property-right assignments were zero and
wealth effects symmetrical, no change in resource allocation would be
implied, according to the Coase theorem (Coase 1960). 3 But in the

sparse references to ED in the economic literature, 4 the converse is
assumed without rigorous justification, at least with respect to use of ED

for assembly. Consolidation of many contiguous but separately owned
parcels of land under one owner supposedly creates a holdout problem,
with each seller having an incentive to hold out to be the last to settle
and capture any rent accruing to the assembly. Because of either monopoly
prices of sellers or high transactions costs or both (since the buyer can

trade off between the two), the free market results in a suboptimal amount
of assembly being undertaken. The next step in the argument, although
not in logic, is that ED improves the situation.

A crude examination of the circumstances in which ED is actually used
does not leave the impression that their outstanding common charac-

teristic is consolidation of ownership rights, which is nowhere mentioned
as a necessary condition of the granting of ED power. In practice, almost
all departments of federal, state, and local government, many regulated

industries, and government-related educational and medical establishments have some form of ED power in most states, regardless of whether
2 To contest the taking, as opposed to the prices paid, the condemned must prove that
the condemnor has used his power "unconstitutionally," "fraudulently," or "abusively."

The courts may, however, review the original grant of ED on the grounds that it is not
for a legitimate public use.

3 "Transaction costs" here include court costs. It is questionable whether the first
precondition of the Coase theorem, exclusively assigned property rights, is met in most
ED contexts, since the condemnor is usually a government-associated agency.

4 E.g., Arrow (1970), Colean (1970), and McCloskey (1972).
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they wish to acquire one parcel for a schoolhouse or campaign headquarters or 1,000 miles of right-of-way for a freeway. The outstanding
characteristic of situations where ED is used is land acquisition by a
government-related body, not consolidation of ownership rights.5 The
two sets, although far from mutually exclusive, are not perfectly overlapping. Notable examples of industries in the United States which must
assemble property, do serve the public, but have not themselves been

granted ED are agriculture, private manufacturing, and suburban
development. 6

However, since the economic efficiency argument for ED rests on its

comparative advantage over the free market in assembling separately
owned parcels into a single ownership unit, this is the focus of the present
study. A necessary condition for ED to be an efficient institution is that

the welfare costs, due to deviations between price paid under ED and the
value of a parcel in its best alternative use, plus resource costs of
transacting, be less than under alternative property right assignments.

After a brief theoretical comparison of the relative efficiencies of ED and
the free market, a model of price determination under ED is described
and then tested with data from urban renewal in Chicago. A comparable

set of data from free-market assemblies was unobtainable. However,
theoretical considerations and the limited evidence available offer no
support for the asserted efficiency of ED.

Theoretical Comparison of ED with Assembly in the
Free Market

Consider an area where there are many homogeneous properties.
Assuming the market functions efficiently in transferring properties to
their highest-valued uses, subject to imperfect information and positive
5A distinction should perhaps be made here between grants of ED for which government relatedness seems to be a necessary condition and actual exercise of the latent power
by use or threat of use of condemnation proceedings. It is possible that ED is more
frequently exercised by bodies which have the latent power when assembly of many
parcels is involved. I know of no body of data to test this hypothesis. Two pieces of crude
evidence tend to support the presumption that ED is most valuable in an assembly
context: (1) Although most government-related bodies now have the power, the earliest
to acquire it were those engaged in assembly, e.g., gristmills, canals, roads, and railroads.
(2) In terms of area taken, the most extensive current uses are for highways, urban renewal, and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, all of which typically involve assembly
(U.S. Congress 1965).

6 These industries, however, have presumably benefited from particular uses of ED:
e.g., agriculture, from the use of ED for drainage, gristmills, and railroads; and private
manufacturing, from the use of ED for highways. Similarly, although only those urban
renewal projects sponsored by a public agency are entitled to use ED, it might be more
correct to identify the "user" of ED as the private real estate industry, to which land
acquired under ED by the urban renewal authorities is ultimately sold at less than the
acquisition cost. In other words, some public agencies may be, more or less, fronts created

by private industries to accommodate the constitutional "public use" requirement. Thus,
it may be misleading to identify ED with government-related agencies.
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search costs, the atomistic market reservation prices7 of current owners

will form a distribution skewed to the right. Transactions will take place
within a range around a mean market value, which will be below the

modal value of the distribution. Then, for purchases of randomly scattered
parcels with an average amount of search per parcel, the supply curve is

infinitely elastic at a price equal to mean market value. The supply curve
of contiguous properties to any buyer, however, is an increasing function

of the number of parcels to be purchased in a given period, because of
the rising probability of encountering owners not at the selling margin

whose reservation price exceeds mean market value of the property. 8 The
supply curve of parcels for assembly is steeper the greater the dispersion
of atomistic reservation prices of current owners in the market.

Figure 1 represents supply and demand conditions of a typical buyer
for parcels for one type of project within the universe of projects requiring
assembly, for example, urban renewal or highways. MCm is the supply
curve of randomly scattered parcels, and MCa is the supply curve of
contiguous properties. Both reflect atomistic reservation prices and social
opportunity costs. The slower the rate of acquisition, the flatter MCa,

approaching MCm in the limit. The demand curve is the marginal value
product curve per parcel of a given size, as part of an assembly, for a

given rate of acquisition and set of initial conditions with respect to
number of buyers in the industry. The slower the rate of acquisition, the

lower the demand curve. 9
If the buyer cannot discriminate between sellers (because reservation

prices are not freely observable), and so expects to pay all n sellers the
reservation price of the nth, MCa is the buyer's average cost curve. Profit
7 "Atomistic market reservation price" is defined as the reservation price of a seller to
a buyer whom he did not suspect of planning an assembly.
8 Assume that assembly involves drawing a sample of size n from the distribution of

atomistic reservation prices. Let Y1 denote the ith order statistic of this sample, i.e.,
Y1 < Y2 < ... < Y,,. The height of the MCa curve, the supply curve of contiguous
parcels, at n parcels is the expected value of the nth-order statistic from a sample of size n.
For any point i between the origin and the point n, the height of MCa measures the

expected value of Yi. Strictly, there is a different MCa curve for each sample size. The
precise shape of the curve is not important. It is sufficient to establish that it is upward
sloping. This follows from the fact that for many density functions, e.g., normal, gamma,
and exponential, the expected value of the nth order statistic has the following form:

E(Y.) = 0 + fI(n)u,
where 0 = mean of underlying distribution, a = standard deviation of underlying

distribution, and fi(n) > 0, fi' > 0, fi" < 0. The exact form of fi(n) depends on the
specific distribution.

9 If the project has some minimum feasible size, the demand curve will be discontinuous at the corresponding number of parcels. If assembly of dispersed ownerships into
one unit permits the internalization of externalities, there may be increasing returns to
scale, implying an upward-sloping demand schedule over an initial range. The shape of
the demand curve may affect the conclusion but not the method of analysis of the respective welfare costs of the free market and ED.
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_M Cm

________ # parcels

Qa Qc Qed per project
FIG. 1.-Welfare costs of assembly with and without eminent domain

maximization implies Qa parcels will be bought. A resource misallocation
cost equal to the triangle W is implied. Rents accrue to the buyer and

to intramarginal sellers.

In the absence of barriers to entry by other buyers and sellers on
alternative sites, these quasi-monopsonist and scarce-factor rents cannot

persist in the long run. Competition among buyers, attempting to capture

the rent which accrues to intramarginal sellers in the absence of discrimination, will lead to the development of techniques to discover true seller

reservation prices. This is facilitated by competition among sellers on
alternative sites. The incentive to conceal atomistic reservation price
exists only if substitutes are not available at competitive prices.

With competition on both sides of the market, seller reservation prices
to an assembler will be no different from atomistic reservation prices.

This implies that MCa is the effective marginal cost curve. The profitmaximizing number of parcels per project is Qc. This is consistent with
the criteria of social optimality, although it is less than Qed at the
intersection of the MVP curve with the market supply curve of isolated
parcels, because the social opportunity cost of contiguous properties

exceeds the social opportunity cost of the same number of randomly

scattered properties.

In the absence of perfect substitutes for a particular site, a rent exists
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that is potentially capturable by the owners of land. However, a holdout
problem, as distinct from a monopoly problem, is implied only if the
rights to the rent are not exclusively assigned. For example, if uniqueness
is obviously specific to a particular parcel, the rent will accrue to its
owner, and there is no reason for the owners of other inputs to raise
reservation prices above atomistic market level. In general, there may be
less than perfect substitutes for many or all parcels in a group, that is, for
the ith of n parcels in a group, A, there exist alternative parcels which

may be substituted for it at a cost to the assembler xi percent higher,
where xi may vary across the n parcels. If each seller in set A anticipates
that sellers of the alternative parcels will settle at their atomistic
reservation prices and that other sellers in set A will settle for not less than

their share of the rent as defined by substitution possibilities, prices and
shares of the rent are determinate. Assembly is characterized by monopoly
prices (or rents to superior factors), but it is misleading to speak of a

holdout rather than a monopoly problem, since changing the unit of
ownership is immaterial.

A distinct holdout problem, specific to assembly, arises only if at least
one seller anticipates that others will settle for less than their "share" of
the rent and therefore tries to capture more than his "share," up to a
maximum for any one seller of the entire rent net of competitive prices
for other inputs. Moreover, the existence of a potential rent, due to lack
of perfect substitutes, may occur in assembly even though there are

physically equivalent sites for a particular project. For competition to be
effective, substitutes must be available at competitive prices throughout
the negotiation process. But assembling many ownerships is typically a

sequential process, because transacting is time consuming. When some
parcels on site A have already been acquired, in negotiations for the

outstanding parcels, site B, assumed physically equivalent, is a less than
perfect substitute unless the expected cost of B gross of transactions costs
is no greater than the expected cost of the remainder of A gross of
transactions costs plus the resale value of parcels already acquired on A
net of transactions cost. Thus, the costs of negotiating many contracts and

of uncertainty as to prices, rather than physical availability, may limit the
operation of competitive forces in an assembly context. The implied
potential rent to outstanding parcels on a particular site when some have

already been acquired creates an incentive to hold out.1o
In conclusion, a problem which is specific to the assembly of several

ownerships into a single unit arises as a combination of a monopoly and
free-rider problem. If a particular site is physically unique, rents will

accrue to current owners as to any scarce factors. Even in the absence of

10 The options contract is a method of maintaining competitive pressures throughout
the negotiation process.
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physical uniqueness, assembly may create a potential rent to the last
parcels to settle, due to transactions costs and uncertainty as to prices of

alternatives. Even if property rights are sufficiently well defined for the
market to function efficiently when changing the unit of ownership is not
in question, the rights to any rents generated by changing the unit of
ownership may not be well assigned, since reservation prices are not

freely observable and there may be uncertainty as to prices charged by
other sellers. This creates a type of free-rider problem, each party having
an incentive to try to capture more than his atomistic reservation price

for his input, on the assumption of asymmetrical behavior by other
parties.

Where rents are attributable to physical uniqueness, they are no

different from rents to scarce factors. No resource misallocation is implied,
but assembly may entail a welfare cost not generally associated with
scarce factors if the rent is dissipated in bargaining over its distribution.
However, where potential rents are attributable solely to the transactions
costs of maintaining competitive pressures, assembly entails resource
misallocation and welfare costs similar to those implied by the monopsony

solution in figure 1. If holdout behavior is anticipated, MCa, reflecting
atomistic reservation prices, is no longer the relevant marginal cost

curve. Expenditure on devices to circumvent or eliminate the incentive
to hold out will be incurred. Such devices include concealment of the

identity of the buyer, the purpose and extent of the planned assembly and
prices paid for parcels, and the use of brokers and special contractual

forms, such as options or uniform price contracts. The optimal level of
such expenditure defines a new MC curve, lying above MCa but not
necessarily equal to MCb, and a new free-market level of output and

welfare cost, which may exceed or fall short of W in figure 1. " The
expenditure on transactions to avoid the holdout problem represents an
additional waste due to assembly, if efficiency is defined relative to the
zero transactions cost situation.

If the free market tends to produce suboptimal-sized assemblies, the

ED "just compensation" standard may have the opposite effect. Just
compensation is defined as "fair market value" exclusive of the value to
this particular seller. If enforced, this implies prices equal to MCm in
figure 1. If the demand curve is assumed unchanged, optimal output, at

Qed, is excessive. Fixing the price at the market average understates the

social opportunity cost. The welfare cost, given by the triangle B, may
be less than or exceed W.

Note that the welfare costs of ED are likely to be high in precisely those

circumstances in which the market is inefficient, that is, where seller

I I The various devices developed in the free market to circumvent the holdout problem
are discussed in Munch (1973).
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reservation prices are dispersed, implying an inelastic social opportunity

cost curve, MCa, and high transactions costs of discriminating between
sellers. A similar symmetry exists in the absence of transactions costs. In

the free market, the buyer would discriminate along the MCa curve.
Under ED, if the expected court award, MCm, were less than MCa, the

value of the parcel to the seller, he would offer the buyer the difference
to prevent the taking of the parcel. Then MCa would be the effective
marginal cost curve to the buyer, and the profit-maximizing output level

would also be socially optimal. Thus, with zero transactions costs, both

the free market and the ED assignments of property rights yield an

optimal result. Since transacting under both regimes is not costless, the
efficiency conclusion on ED relative to the market is theoretically
ambiguous, even if fair market value is paid.
Price Determination under ED

Constitutional dictates notwithstanding, since fair market value is not a
freely observable datum, both buyer and seller will invest in searching for

the most favorable price, and the outcome may differ systematically from
fair market value, depending on the costs of and returns to search for the
two parties. For both, the optimum search strategy implies setting a

reservation price for settlement out of court which maximizes expected

wealth, net of transactions costs, over the two alternatives, settlement in
or out of court.

Price determination under ED may be formulated by the following
reduced-form model:
Sb

Ss
cb

Cs

=

=

=

=

b()

S

(2)

Cb(Pm),

E[k(PC

-

(3)

P)]

(4)

Pc = Pm - hb(Cb) + hs(Cs) + v; v [0, ru(Pm)], (5)

E(PC) = PC + W; W [0' [0, 2(Pm)], (6)
E(PC)S = PC + Z; Z [0, &2(Pm)], (7)

pmax = E(Pc)b + (Cb - Sb), (8)

pa = E(P )s - (CS - Ss), (9)
max pmin = (P b (+ Cb + C S _ S > 0, 10)
P = j(prnax + pmin) (11)
=[E(PC)b + E(PC) ] + I4[(Cb - Sb) - (CS - SS)]
=PC + <[ACb - ACs], (11')
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where Sb = buyer's costs of out-of-court settlement, Cb = buyer's court
costs, S' = seller's costs of out-of-court settlement, CS = seller's court

costs, ACb = Cb -Sb, ACS = Cs - Ss, PC = price awarded in court,
E(Pc)b = buyer's expectation of court award, E(Pc)5 = seller's expectation of court award, Pm = market value, Pax = buyer's maximum

offer in out-of-court negotiations, pmin = seller's minimum ask price in

out-of-court negotiations, P, = price determined voluntarily in out-ofcourt settlement, and v, w, z = stochastic error terms. All variables are
measured relative to market value.

Equations (1) and (2) state that settlement costs are a constant

proportion of market value. Equation (3) makes buyer court costs a
variable function of market value. Equation (4) states that seller court

costs are the expected value of the attorney's fee, which, in a contingent
fee contract typically used in ED cases, is some fraction of the difference
between the court award and the buyer's final offer.
Equation (5) describes the determination of price in court. Any
systematic deviation of court award from market value is the result of

expenditure by both parties on court inputs and the function hb( ) and
hS( ), which relate this expenditure to influence on court verdict.
Equations (6) and (7) state that both parties have unbiased expectations
of court award, with random errors having zero mean and variance a

function of parcel value. The assumption that expectations are unbiased
is plausible if both hire legal counsel with experience in the field of
condemnation.

Equations (8) and (9) state the upper and lower bounds, respectively,

on offer and ask prices consistent with wealth maximization.12 Equation
(10) is a necessary condition for settlement out of court, that is, pmax >

Painf. Rearranging terms produces

(Cb - sb) + (Cs - SS) ? E(Pc)s - E(Pc)b z - w.
Thus, settlement out of court requires that the sum of the incremental
costs due to going to court exceed the difference between the seller's and
buyer's expectations of court award. Note that this is independent of the
assignment of liability for court costs.
Equation (11) describes the determination of price in an out-of-court

settlement. It makes the simplest assumption that the parties split the

difference between PO ax and Pamin. The subsequent analysis applies if I is
replaced by any positive fraction, to reflect "unequal bargaining power,"

and the A in equation (11') omitted, since settlement costs are assumed
to be an invariant fraction of market value.

12 Actual final offers and asks may lie within these bounds, depending on each party's
assessment of the probability of going to court.
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The Alternative Hypotheses

Given this model, one set of sufficient conditions for prices .aid under ED
to approximate market value with random errors is the following: (i)
Anticipation of ED does not affect market value prior to the filing of the
petition to condemn. It is fair market value as of the date of filing the
petition to condemn that the courts are instructed to award. The timing

of filing is at the discretion of the condemnor. (ii) Cb(Pm) =- 3s(Pm) that
is, buyer and seller court costs bear the same functional relate . to market

value. (iii) Sb = Ss. (iv) hb( ) = h5( ), that is, the returns to court
expenditure are the same for buyer and seller.
These conditions yield the null hypothesis that prices paid under ED

approximate market value with random errors, regardless of whether the
price is negotiated voluntarily or awarded in court. An alternative
hypothesis may be generated by incorporating into the model the

following assumptions based on economic theory or empirical evidence

from urban renewal in Chicago: (i') Anticipation of ED tends to depress
market value. ED implies a loss of use rights associated with the property,
in particular, effective loss of the right to refuse to sell and greater
uncertainty of lease duration, since condemnors have special rights to
terminate leases. Thus, anticipation of ED would tend to depress market

value, ceteris paribus.' 3 (ii') Cb(Pm) : CS(Pm), that is, optimum expenditures on court costs are not the same for buyer and seller.

Optimum expenditure on court costs depends on the costs of and
returns to hiring legal "inputs" and constraints on choice of quality and

quantity. The buyer in condemnation cases is typically constrained by

statutory requirements on the use of legal personnel. Thus, the Department of Urban Renewal in Chicago is represented in all court cases by

the City of Chicago's corporation counsel and is required to obtain at
least two independent appraisals in each case. The seller, on the other

13 If at time to, condemnation is anticipated at some future date, to, the present value
of the property at to is

(I + r)n r
where E (Ptn) = expected price obtainable at t, under ED and R = value of service
stream derived from property from to to t,. Uncertainty as to the value placed by the
courts on maintenance expenditure may reduce the optimum maintenance program and

reduce R; if the property is rented, this will be exacerbated by a reduction in the demand
for leases because of uncertainty as to duration. Thus, even if the courts award the market

value of the property, measured as the present value of its expected income stream at tn
when condemnation is filed, this PVJn will be lower than it would have been in the absence
of anticipated condemnation. This may be offset by defensive expenditures on "improvements" that are valued by appraisers and the courts higher than they would have been
by the market, or by arranging dummy sales at inflated prices to be used in court as
evidence of market value. Thus, the net effect of anticipation of ED on property value is
ambiguous a priori. However, since the properties acquired for urban renewal in Chicago
are predominantly rented, the former negative effect is expected to dominate.
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hand, presumably adjusts the quality (or implicit hourly wage rate) 14 of
attorneys and witnesses commensurate with the stakes of the case.
However, on the other dimension of court expenditure-hours per

case-it seems likely that the seller faces greater constraints than the
buyer. Handling any case requires some minimum number of hours of

appearance in court independent of the value of the property being
litigated. This number of hours times the implicit hourly wage rate of the

lowest-quality lawyer represents a minimum fixed cost of going to court
for the seller. The buyer, on the other hand, may have greater flexibility

in reducing hours per case because of the possibility of grouping several
similar parcels in one case. The possibility of spreading the fixed cost of a

court case over several parcels is available on equal terms to sellers only
if the costs of negotiating to hire the same lawyer are zero.
If we ignore for the moment constraints on hours per case, constraints

on the buyer's choice of quality of lawyer will have the effect of raising
the buyer's expenditure on low-valued properties and lowering it on

high-valued properties relative to the seller's expenditure. The effect is
illustrated for low-valued properties in figure 2.
Figure 2 represents the costs and returns to hours per case for the buyer

and seller. The null-hypothesis supply and demand curves, So and Do, are
drawn on the assumptions that both parties face unconstrained choices,
that both correctly anticipate the other's behavior and adjust accordingly,
and that courts are neutral. Both would have identical expenditures,

WOHO.

The curves SI and D1 are drawn on the assumption that the buyer is
constrained to employ above-optimum-quality lawyers at a higher wage
rate, W1. Assuming the seller's choice of quality unchanged at W0, the
buyer's lawyers will be relatively more effective, implying an upward
shift in the buyer's returns-per-hour curve and a downward shift in the
seller's returns-per-hour curve to D1. Thus, the effect of the constraint is
to raise buyer expenditure on court influence above that of the seller

(W1 H1 > WOH1). Given the buyer's constrained choice, it may be
optimal for the seller to raise quality above W0. But this need not result

in an equal level of expenditure. If quality levels were equalized at W1,

the returns curves would shift back to D0o the curves representing returns
to equal-quality hours. Optimal-hours input would be H.. Thus, the same
court outcome would be achieved with a more quality intensive input

mix. But if hours per case are not flexible downward but are constrained

at some minimum above H, the higher-quality lawyer would require a
higher fraction of the award, implying a downward shift in the seller's
demand curve, and reduced expenditure.

14 Although on the seller's side the form of contract is typically a contingent fee or
share contract, not a fixed hourly wage contract, the seller can vary the implicit hourly

wage rate and hours per case indirectly by choice of attorney and by varying the
attorney's share of the final award.
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FIG. 2.-Expenditure on court inputs

Thus, constraints on reduction in quality of legal inputs by the buyer
and on hours per case for the seller will tend to result in the buyer's
expenditure on court costs exceeding the seller's on low-valued properties.

For high-valued properties, the quality ceiling produces the reverse
effect. The hours constraint is inoperative.
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A third force tending to produce the same result is the existence of
economies of scale for the buyer. Court recognition of precedent implies
an outward shift in the returns-per-hour curve for parcels which are
sufficiently homogeneous for a precedent effect to operate. In the urban
renewal sample, homogeneity, and hence the buyer's relative advantage

due to precedent economies of handling many parcels, is expected to be
greater on low- than on high-valued parcels. Again, transactions costs are

assumed to prevent sellers from enjoying these scale economies to the
same degree.

These assumptions about the structure of court costs and returns imply:
Cb > C' on low-valued properties;

acb ans
< < 0.

OPm aPm

Incorporating into equations (5) and ( 11') yields the alternative
hypotheses:

1) PC < Pm on low-valued properties;

dPc _ -d[hb(Cb)] + d[hs(CN)]

+ >o0.

dPm dPm dPm

Thus, in the absence of any court bias, high-valued parcels will tend to

receive a higher fraction of market value in court than will low-valued
parcels.

2) ?h.dPV dPC 1 (dCb dC.S <O
dPm dPm 2 KdPm dPm/

Prices reached voluntarily in out-of-court settlements rise less, relative to
market value, than do court awards.

Empirical Evidence

The empirical estimates of the relationship between ED prices and market

value are based on land acquisitions by the Chicago Department of Urban

Renewal for three large projects during the period 1962-70.15 The data
obtained from HUD consist of final price paid (Ped), assessed value for
tax purposes ( TA VL), and date of acquisition (DATE) for all parcels. In

addition, for all parcels in two of the three projects, method of acquisition
voluntary settlement or court-is known. In order to compare price

actually paid with market value, an estimate of market value was derived
for each parcel in the ED sample. The procedure used was to estimate a
I-' The projects are Southeast Englewood, Near West Side, and Lincoln Park I.

This content downloaded from 130.91.116.52 on Mon, 06 Jun 2016 15:27:22 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

l - 0 - 0 o 0
oo C LO 00 r- LO D - CO - O LO

cNl

CO

LO

LO

00

't

C

CN

0)

0

0

1-d

CN1

00

C4
CN
C)
L 0
CIO CO
COOC00
1l CO
r
C4t
CN
CO
COC
dZ CC)
COl
CO
V:
CM
C1
en
co CO
c oOm
co ?CC

00

0

0

o

O

(

-

LO

s

C

CC)

CO

CO

CO

o

e-4

o

0

c

r>

Ln

LO

LO

C4

t-

-

O

CO
LO Un O) r- t CO Ct 0 o CO d0 O

l-

C

00 00 C 14 en4 C) CC

~-o m _ *scso
*

66

66

*-_-

-O Io I- ICD
II

o

4C
I

N 0+
co >c~1 CD t) LO
N COLO -CO ~~~~~~~~~~~~~I C4 CO LO

S^ x, ~~I I I I I I

;T4

0

~

-.

r-

:IC

l-1

00

oo

n-

o-

n

n

_C

CN4

C

*

_

O-

*

CO-

n

*

CD

t- r
-o
.
.C)CO4
co
co
COqCO

*

o

C-I

0-

_

C C
O
C

D.l

CD
n ) : o
- o
cn LO
C) CD
_ :IA
r- :--,c
. *
-c
o

* 0

66

6

--

0-

--CD

z

m ~~~~~~~~~~ct._o C; vi u:X s

pp rm r---C- It
LoCj. d
LO
. CO
co t- _m
r
w C1
--4 )
COn
COo
q --tCO)CO
LoCO4
(0cCO

<
X S * COC * C+rOC .
ON_
n Lon
_ -.
H~~~~~~~~~~~~~11
--*on,
o,
LO CO
o V-s
o
m

tO

C~~)-

E-Q

m

CD--

co

(

co

*co

to

CO00LO

00

0-

co(

-

(00o

0-c1n

o
C

r

> + s dz + _ W b ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~o _ __
CD CD CD CO CD O V

;

W

on
o_
osr;
Lf* _ . co
(0 or
CO oo
*-1o_
(0_.
0*.
o LO
Cr -. -- (- co 0~- coC n tr-.
cot-. (0tLO .:i( t- tC to- CDCO
0D-- 0( 0cCDC-i, - OCO 0 --fCO

CDLO 0- c cCO oCO 00 CD1 0 0 Or--

?

6t-

g666-

t

00

r--a)-. C 0-. 00 0 0.s 0-

0-?0

0X--. 0--. , tO 0 -. s- (0-. = C - 0CO C t Lo b- LO t--C

L. n
O .COO
-CO
0 C
(0O -co(0C
m rt
.0N
co Cj
C) CLo
cf ,I
o OON
CD C,
CD
O,"1
l t--(0
C, c . *r: o n c c o _C o- Ln ON C- -CZ -- Lo-

0 dz cs ~ ~ ~ ~ - Lo ) - e DtON r n co

o o CN -4 cm I" -4 co r- 0 C C) CM s s co 0 0s S >
CO ~--. o -o d - - O - c X l- -- C1 C-O
O-ON (0 (0- CO O- - LO- -C tO OCO CDC

Co( coO ED -- - 0) r----- 0( ~ -j t-- -C to -. t--*i-t Lo Lo
ON OX t On co m Cot-- Lo C o co o. c Co c d' -o C to t-t--- r 0

n

.

0

co

C)~~~~~~~~1

.

ce

C,

*

C

0

l-

0

Cq

0

dn

LO

*

0

CI

.

N N st s-, N it i-, N ;t it r-t~~~~~~~~

0 CO --.tO ON4 ONCO *CO -j4* .

ON CoI .
CO .
v LOl*
. III
. I2IILC-II
. .48.6

5-. No CX:o No <.D C~l Cn o No oo o c
O C's C's 486

This content downloaded from 130.91.116.52 on Mon, 06 Jun 2016 15:27:22 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

EMINENT

DOMAIN

487

TABLE 2
ED SAMPLE SUBDIVIDED BY ZONE

(t-STATISTIC IN PARENTHESES)
A. REGRESSIONS OF Ped B. REGRESSIONS OF Pm
ZONE

C

Pm

R2/SEE*

C

Ped

R2/SEE*

R4 ..... -11.2807 2.20652 .6437 6.60185 0.291745 .6437
n = 202 (-10.4540) (19.0102) (.430314) (46.493) (19.01) (0.15647)
R5 ..... -2.71576 1.27976 .1476 8.40721 0.115344 .1476
n = 192 (-1.28492) (5.75121) (.696318) (44.2836) (5.75124) (0.209045)
C ..... 6.01600 1.64972 .2363 8.20651 0.143216 .2363
n = 232 (-3.1975) (8.43511) (.70775) (48.909) (8.43517) (2.0853)

B ..... -9.5534 1.99435 .6003 6.77291 0.301006 .6003
n = 147 (-7.24648) (14.7574) (.48559) (33.465) (14.757) (0.188652)

Pmmin Pedmin PMmean Pedmean Pmmax Pedmax
R4 ..... 6,180 2,920 11,272 9,200 35,260 135,000
R5 ..... 6,464 4,985 13,619 13,000 22,100 24,200

C ..... 7,729 6,340 15,449 20,100 28,300 53,700

B ..... 9,045 5,515 17,951 22,100 38,600 98,800
NOTE.-Definition of variables:

predicted ED prices given Pm

,m (min) minimum estimated market led(mn) minimum and regression coefficients
1,m (mean); = mean ' ,alues fronq P^ed (mean) = mean estimated, from regression of
Pm(max) ) maximum Pm = Xedfl Ped(max) maximum Ped on Pm (first set above)
* SEE = standard error of estimate.

relationship between market value, assessed value, and several property

characteristics from a sample of properties sold on the free market in
areas of Chicago similar in character to those where urban renewal
projects have been undertaken.16 The estimating equations used are the
last four reported in table 1. The coefficients obtained were then applied

to data on the same explanatory variables to generate an estimate of

market value, Pm, for all parcels in the ED sample.
Table 2 reports the results of ordinary least-squares regressions of price

paid under ED on estimated market value. Since the equation is estimated
in logarithmic form, the null hypothesis predicts a zero intercept and

coefficient of unity on pm. The evidence strongly supports the alternative
16 The market sample consists of property sales in Chicago over the period 1968-72
in the Community Areas (as defined by the 1960 census) in which some urban renewal
project has been located. Sample size considerations dictated drawing from a much larger
area than that covered by the ED sample, which includes only three of the 20 or
more urban renewal sites. Theoretically, it is appropriate to draw the market sample
from areas similar in character to the ED sample but not sufficiently close to actual urban
renewal sites for property values to have been affected, since ED compensation is not
supposed to reflect value of the property to the buyer. In practice it was found that
private market sales in the immediate vicinity of urban renewal sites were very sparse, so
contamination of the market sample by the effects of urban renewal should be minimal.
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hypothesis, that low-valued properties receive less than market value and

high-valued properties receive more than market value.1 7
To test the plausibility of the results and obtain an idea of the order

of magnitude involved, the mean, minimum, and maximum Pm were
calculated for each zoning class and compared with the corresponding
values implied by the regression equations for ED prices. The exact
results vary across zones, but the generalization that ED is a tax on
low-valued and a subsidy on high-valued properties holds for all zones.
As a rough approximation, a $7,000 parcel receives about $5,000, a

$13,000 property breaks even, and a $40,000 property may get two or
three times its market value.
The regressions in table 3 are designed to investigate which property

characteristics are associated with deviations of ED price from market

value (PDIF = Ped - Pm). If deviations of ED prices from market value
were due solely to factors common to all properties of a particular value,
the coefficients in the PDIF equations should be insignificantly different
from zero. The consistently positive coefficients on TA VL are surprising

if Pm accurately incorporates all of the systematic relation between
tax-assessed value and market value. A possible explanation is that either
appraisers or the courts treat assessed value as an indicator of market
value and fail to recognize that component of actual assessed value which
is a deviation from the average market assessment ratio and which would
be capitalized into property value in a free-market sale because of the

effect on tax liability. This would imply a coefficient closer to unity for

the ED than for the market sample, which is in fact found.'8 While there
may be some validity to this explanation, it is insufficient alone to account
for the evidence on deviations of ED prices from market value. If courts
17 This estimate is no doubt affected by, but cannot be readily explained away in

terms of, either random or systematic error in Pm. The purpose of using a predictive
equation for Pm is to control for any systematic variation across properties in the ratio of
assessed value to market value, and hence avoid a systematic bias in the estimate of
market value that would exist if assessed value alone were used as a simple proxy for
market value. Systematic bias in the predicted Pm may nonetheless exist, since measurement error in the explanatory variables of the predictive equation will lead to biased
estimates of the coefficient vector used to predict Pm. The direction of the bias is not
known, however, in the case of a multivariate ordinary least squares regression with
errors in more than one independent variable. Assuming that the errors in Pm are additive
in the logarithmic specification and uncorrelated with either the true values or the
stochastic disturbance term in the relation between ED price and true market value,
then a lower bound on the true value of the slope coefficient is given by the estimate

obtained by regressing Ped on Pm (set A in table 2) and an upper bound by the reciprocal
of the coefficient obtained by regressing Pm on Ped (set B in table 2). Both exceed unity.
However, if the assumptions with respect to the error structure in Pm are not met, this

test does not yield bounds on the true coefficient. In the absence of knowledge of the
direction of bias in Pm, nothing can be said a priori about the direction of potential bias
in the estimated relation between ED price and market value.

18 The total coefficient on TA VL is the sum of the coefficient of the PDIF equations
(table 3) and that from the market equations (table 1) used in calculating Pm.
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were guided solely by assessed value, there would be no reason for sellers
to engage lawyers and appraisers to defend them in court. Moreover, the
adherence-to-assessed-value hypothesis cannot account for the divergence
between the pattern of court awards and settlement prices in relation to
market value predicted by the court-costs theory and confirmed by the
evidence discussed below.

Other variables of interest are TEN, the number of tenants with listed
phones, and DATE, the date of acquisition, measured in months from
earliest observation in each location.
In the market sample, TEN, the number of tenants with listed phones,
is expected to measure a combination of tenant capacity and current
occupancy. If tenant capacity and potential income vary among structures
to an extent not fully captured in assessed value, the positive coefficients

observed in the predictive equation for the two residential zones are to

be expected. The significant positive coefficients on TEN in three of the
four PDIF equations then suggest that high capacity or occupancy rates

have a greater impact on ED awards than on free-market prices. If it is
the case that anticipation of ED reduces occupancy rates due to

uncertainty of lease duration and compensability of improvement and
maintenance expenditure and that this is reflected in lower ED awards,
then ED creates an incentive for the buyer to delay acquisition or hold

out to depress prices analogous to the seller's supposed incentive to hold

out in the free market.' 9
However, if the effect of ED, whether intended or not, is to reduce
occupancy rates below normal, then the observed number of tenants will
measure with error the potential rental capacity of properties in the ED

sample. Then the positive effect of rental capacity on market value will
be biased down in the estimates of market value. If courts respond to

potential rather than actual occupancy, a positive coefficient on TEN in
19 Residential buildings are predominantly tenant occupied in urban renewal areas
of Chicago, with average period of occupancy 1-3 years. Anticipation of the effect of ED
by sellers presumably includes awareness that high vacancy rates may depress ED prices.
This would create an incentive to maintain occupancy rates by lowering rental charges.
The extent to which such defensive behavior by sellers is a good investment depends on
the relative magnitudes of the price elasticity of demand for leases, the reduction in
demand for leases due to uncertainty as to duration, and the elasticity of ED prices with
respect to number of tenants and rental rates. An upper bound on the estimated effect
on ED price of an increase by one in the number of tenants lies between 5 and 10 percent.
As a rough calculation, at the point of means for the court sample (table 5), an increase
in the number of listed tenants from one to two would raise ED price by $600-$1,200.
For any individual landlord, the demand for leases is likely to be inelastic, since he cannot
assume other landlords will maintain higher rentals as he reduces his if anticipation of
ED is widespread in the neighborhood. The less elastic the demand curve, the greater the
reduction in rental rates required to increase the number of tenants, and the greater the
loss in rental income over the interim between anticipation of ED and filing the petition
to condemn. Thus, stocking up with tenants in anticipation of ED is only likely to be

profitable if the demand curve is elastic, or, if inelastic, where the expected delay is short,
so that loss of rental income is less than expected gain in ED price.
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the PDIF equations may be expected. Given this potential for errors-invariables bias if the effect to be measured in fact exists, it seems, in
principle, not possible to measure the holdout incentives of buyers to

depress occupancy and hence prices under ED in the absence of better
data on potential rental capacity.

The coefficients on the DA TE variable only support the weak conclusion
that there is no evidence that ED holds down the rise in prices over the
duration of the assembly. The coefficients must be interpreted as the
difference between the monthly rate of inflation in the market and ED

samples, since the former was incorporated into Pm (except in R5, since
for this zone DATE was insignificant in the market sample). But the
market rate of increase of property values differs across the city at any

point in time and over time. The average market rate of inflation was
probably less in the early 1960s, from which roughly half the ED sample
was drawn, than in 1968-72, from which the market data were drawn.

Therefore, ignoring interarea differences, the null hypothesis that ED
prices follow the same pattern over time as the market would imply a

negative coefficient on DA TE in the equations for PDIF. The size should
be the difference between the monthly market rate of inflation in 1968-72
and 1962-65 weighted by the proportion of the ED sample drawn from
the earlier period. Taking 5 percent and 2.5 percent as the average annual
rates for the two periods, weighting the difference by 0.5 yields a rough
estimate for the expected coefficient on DA TE of -0.001. Of the estimated

coefficients, two exceed and two fall short of this benchmark for the null
hypothesis. To the extent prices under an assembly in the free market
would rise faster over time than the market average due to the holdout
problem, the conclusions are more favorable for ED.
The second proposition to be tested is that prices are the same fraction

of market value for parcels settling in and out of court, against the
alternative that high-valued parcels receive a higher price (gross of court

costs) relative to market value in court awards than in voluntary settle-

ments, because court costs or expenditures fall, relative to parcel value,
more for buyers than for sellers.20
The Southeast Englewood and Near West Side samples, for which there
are data on method of settlement, were pooled and divided into subsets

according to whether the price was awarded in court or agreed on in
20 It may be shown that the predictions of the alternative hypothesis of the model of
price determination,

d (PcIPj) > 0 and d (Pv/Pm) _ d(PcPm) < 0
dPm

dPm

dPm

imply

d ln P >1 and d ln P, < d ln PC
dlnPm dlnPm dlnPm'

which is the form in which the theory was tested.
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voluntary negotiations. The results are reported in table 4. The regressions
were run in both directions to estimate bounds on the true coefficient, on
the assumption of additive measurement errors in both variables when

the equation is estimated in logarithmic form.
Comparing equations (2) and (3) in table 4 in the regressions of Ped

on Pm) we find that the intercept is lower and the coefficient on Pm higher
in the court set than in the voluntary set. The difference is statistically
significant by a Chow test. This evidence tends to refute the null hypothesis
and support the alternative of greater regressivity in court. A similar

conclusion is implied by the regressions of Pm on Ped. However, if these
two sets of estimates are treated as bounds on the true coefficients, the
ranges overlap:

2.645 < Pf < 4.87; 1.475 < P, < 3.81,
where fC is the coefficient on Pm in the court set and f,3 is the coefficient
in the voluntary set. The hypothesis that the true values are equal can

therefore not be firmly rejected.
Table 4 also reports estimates of the same equations with the sample

subdivided into low- and high-valued parcels, the division being made at

$12,000, which is close to the mean for both court and voluntary sets. The
purpose is to test the possibility that the true relation is nonlinear and
that differences in the estimated coefficients for the court and voluntary

sets are attributable to different frequency distributions of parcel values
for the two sets. The evidence does not support this conclusion.
Two indirect tests of the reasonableness of the model of price determination may be performed with these estimates. First, cost minimization

for the buyer requires that P, < E(P,)b + Cb. Both E(PC)b and Cb are
unknown. However, an estimate of the lower bound on E(P,)b is given
by Pc, observed court award for a property of equal market value. It is a
lower bound because the voluntary set will not be a random drawing from
the distribution of parcels but will tend to "select" those parcels on which
the buyer overestimated the court award and thus offered a high price
relative to the seller's minimum ask (assuming errors in buyer and
seller expectations are not positively correlated). Then cost minimization
requires that

P- PC < E(PC)b - PC + Cb;
that is, the difference between the regression estimates of settlement price
and court award for a property of a given market value is a lower bound
on the sum of the buyer's error in predicting court award and his court

costs. At the sample mean of $12,000, P,, - PC = $3,000, which seems
not unreasonable.

The second test utilizes the assumption that prices reached in voluntary
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TABLE 5
SUMMARY STATISTICS OF VARIABLES FOR COURT AND VOLUNTARY SETS
Court Voluntary
Antilog Antilog
Variable Mean Mean Variance Mean Mean Variance
Ped*....... 9.15617 $9,475 1.00027 9.57907 14,450 0.404433
TAVL* .... 8.16021 3,495 0.988743 8.34385 4,250 0.590253
Pm* ....... 9.35127 11,550 0.080279 9.38721 11,950 0.070708
DA TE ..... 9.64748 ... 18.3893 7.9629 ... 26.5488

DC ........ 0.10791 ... 0.09696 0.07407 ... 0.068842
TEN ...... 1.07914 ... 1.986 1.8444 ... 3.90136

VAL ....... 75.1439 ... 883.312 71.8333 ... 634.080
* Arithmetic mean of logs = geometric mean of absolute numbers:
Arithmetic Mean Variance Arithmetic Mean Variance

Ped

.15,199.6

0.335801

17,881.7

0.192506

E08

E08

A
E09
E09
Pm .11,980.6 0.118874 12.385.8 0.134233

settlements are the average of minimum offer and maximum ask, which
reduces to

PV = PC + j(Cb - Cs).
Three thousand dollars, the difference between settlement price and

court award for a mean-valued property, seems excessive as an estimate
of half the difference in court costs. However, again the model may be

salvaged by selectivity bias considerations.

The voluntary set will comprise two groups of parcels, A and B, on
which the buyer overestimated and the seller underestimated, respectively,

Pcv, the hypothetical court award on a parcel which settled out of court.
Assuming uncorrelated errors, for set A
PV = Pcv + .(Cb - Cs) + i[E(PCv)b -pcv] > PV,
and for set B

PV = PCv + i(Cb - CS) - j[PCV - E(PcY)] < Pv)
where

PV = PC, + _(Cb - Cs).

Thus, observed Pv is an unbiased proxy for Pv only if A and B are equalsized samples from the same population and if average buyer and seller
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errors are equal in absolute value. If the buyer makes larger or more

frequent errors, set A will dominate and observed P, > Ps, so that
P- P > 1 (Cb - Cs).
The question arises whether observed Pc is an unbiased proxy for PC .
By a similar argument, the court set will comprise two groups of parcels,

with negative errors in buyer expectations of PC,, and therefore low offers

relative to PV, and positive errors in seller expectations, and therefore
relatively high asks. However, even if negative buyer errors dominate in
frequency or mean absolute magnitude, actual court awards are still

unbiased for PC, if the courts are unaffected by the asks and offers of
pretrial negotiations. This assumption is plausible if it is cheap for sellers
to match low offers by symmetrically high asks in court in excess of asks

in pretrial negotiations. This is implicit in equation (5), which makes
court award only a fraction of market value and expenditure on court
inputs.

Conclusions

This study of urban renewal in Chicago suggests that ED does not ensure
that fair market value is paid in an assembly. The mean ratio of price
to market value is 1.27 for the court sample and 1.45 for the voluntary
sample, with a weighted average of 1.388. This does not necessarily imply

a suboptimal amount of assembly, since the opportunity cost of land for
an assembly is expected to exceed mean market value. However, it seems
unlikely that the pattern of reservation prices corresponds to the pattern

of ED prices. Under ED, high-valued parcels systematically receive more
than market value and low-valued parcels receive less than market value.
This is consistent with a simple model of how prices would be determined
assuming optimizing behavior within the constraints imposed by ED and
a structure of court costs which induces higher buyer expenditure relative
to the seller's on low-valued properties, but the opposite relation on

high-valued properties. Obviously, the structure of court costs may vary
in different contexts, so the conclusion with respect to the pattern of ED
prices is only generalizable in similar contexts.
The full-cost calculus of the relative efficiency of ED and the free
market in handling assemblies cannot be made without data on comparable market assemblies and on transactions costs, including labor

inputs and forgone income on land due to delay in transferring it to a
higher-valued use. Both components of transactions costs are likely to be
higher under ED. Thus, both theoretical considerations and the evidence
available leave unproved the case for the superior efficiency of ED.
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Appendix
TABLE Al
GLOSSARY

Variable

Definition

Source

PRL ....... Price of property in sample of Transfer tax stamps reported in
random market sales; natural Real Estate News
logarithm

Ped ........ Price of property in ED sample; Unpublished HUD records
natural logarithm

TA VL ...... Assessed value of land plus Cook County property tax roles:
assessed value of improvements; 1969-70, market sample; 1965,
natural logarithm Lincoln Park ED sample.
Unpublished HUD records:
Southeast Englewood and
Near West Side samples (date
of assessment unknown)

VALL ...... Value per foot of frontage; Olcott's Land Values (year prior
natural logarithm to the year of the first observation for the market and for
each ED sample)

Z ........ Zoning category Olcott's Land Values (year as for
VALL)

TEN ....... Number of tenants with listed Donnelley's Street Address Directory
phones (year as for VALL)

DC ........ Commercial use dummy; 0 = no Donnelley's Street Address Directory
commercial use; 1 = commercial
use

DCT

.......

DC

x

TAVL

...

DA TE ..... Number of months from month As for PRL and Ped
of first observation in each sample
DZ ........ Zoning dummy; 0 = more re- As for Z
strictive zone; 1 = less restrictive zone
DZT

.......

DZ

x

TAVL

...

Pm ........ Predicted market value of pro- ...
perties in ED sample; natural
logarithm
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